“[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know
that we know.
There are known unknowns; that is to say there are
things that, we now know we don't know.
But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things
we do not know, we don't know. ”
— US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld
While I was never much of a
fan of Secretary Rumsfeld, it always struck me as peculiar the people took such
issue with this statement as it seems a fairly logical distillation of a rather
complex thing. Given that a number of Our Man's friends, acquaintances
and contacts are in the financial world, it's even stranger that folks
criticized the statement as it would seem to me that unknown unknowns could
just as easily be called Black Swans.
Though, I suppose it was made in a pre-2008 world when black swans weren't as
popular a topic.
So, why bring up Secretary
Rumsfeld’s quote now? Well, despite what you might hear if you have the
misfortune to tune into CNBC, it’s okay to not know or have any conviction in a
particular outcome. It is however, important that you realize that you
have limited conviction and behave accordingly. We’re taught that if we
do the “work” – if we research, think about and analyze a problem – we’ll find
the answer (i.e. reach a conclusion in which we have conviction). It’s
those known unknowns and the pesky Black Swans (unknown unknowns) that mean
this isn’t the case in reality.
I bring this up because Our
Man’s portfolio continues to run relatively low exposure and the performance is
where it has been all year, roughly flat. The low exposure is a
reflection of my lack of conviction; that I don’t know. On the Equity-side, this is easy to explain – while the current positions have
sufficient assets or earnings to make them ‘cheap’, most of the driver of future returns is
based upon some form of change or future growth. While I believe that
you’re paying little to nothing for this growth and/or I’m more positive on the
probability of its occurrence, potential size, and proximity, it’s also very
likely given their uncertain nature that these factors will be influenced by
the macro environment. Thus, the positions are undersized to reflect my
well-known macro skepticism. What will
cause the equity book to grow? Well, a
change in the macro conditions, a change in the risk/reward in existing names,
or adding new names or a theme to the book; expect to hear more on these topics
soon.
So, if I’m bearish, why are the
Puts/Hedges and China thesis portfolios so small? Well, for the following reasons: we’re not there
yet and the Fed (and other Central Banks).
While my bearishness is unchanged and the economy remains relatively
weak (and I think noticeably weaker than people realize) it isn’t yet absolutely
weak. As discussed before, my two
favourite indicators for getting a sense of where the economy stands today are the
Philly Fed’s Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti Business Conditions Index
and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index.
The second reason is the Fed
who have shown a belief that throwing liquidity at problems will solve them,
despite the lack of evidence that it does any more than provide a temporary
sugar high while potentially creating greater distortions in the markets. However, their willingness to do so seemingly
every year (surely a sign of its outstanding success) means that there is a
higher bar required (i.e. the economy must be weaker than historically) or
signs of greater exogenous weakness (China and Europe) before I’m willing to
increase the size.
In short, my current level of conviction is relatively low ("I don't know") and thus the portfolio's level of exposure is low. So I'm spending my time doing two things (i) waiting for the data to change and help me build some short-medium term conviction in the existing theses, and (ii) looking into, researching, thinking about and analyzing some new ones. When I've either built greater conviction in the existing theses or am close to putting new ones into the book, then this blog will become more lively and the portfolio's exposure and risk will start to increase.